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ABSTRACT
Between 1913 and 1929, real GDP per person in the UK fell 1 percent, while this same measure
of economic activity rose about 25 percent in the rest of the world. Why was Britain so depressed
in a decade of strong economic activity around the world? This paper argues that the standard
explanations of contractionary monetary shocks and an overvalued nominal exchange rate are not
the prime suspects for killing the British economy. Rather, we argue that large, negative sectoral
shocks, coupled with generous unemployment beneﬁts and housing subsidies, are the primary causes
of this long and deep depression.
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Reserve System.1. Introduction
The United Kingdom entered a major depression shortly after World War I and re-
mained depressed through World War II. This large and persistent depression was unique
among the industrialized countries. While many countries suﬀered depressions in the early
1930s, worldwide economic growth was rapid in the 1920s. For example, UK real GDP per
adult fell about 1 percent between 1913 and 1929 while real GDP per capita in the rest of the
world rose over 30 percent during this same period. This paper asks why the UK had such a
large and persistent depression after World War I. We analyze the UK depression using the
same neoclassical methodology we developed in our analyses of the U.S. Great Depression
(Cole and Ohanian, 1999, 2001a, 2001b). Our analysis suggests that government policies
that reduced the incentive to work are almost surely the cause of the UK’s 20-year Great
Depression.
We begin by summarizing UK macroeconomic performance during the interwar period.
We present data on output, productivity and factor inputs. These data show that all of
t h ed e c r e a s ei no u t p u ti sd u et oal a r g ed e c r e a s ei nl a b o ri n p u t ,r e ﬂecting about an 18
percent decrease in hours per worker and an 11 percent decrease in employment. We then
evaluate the conventional wisdom that deﬂationary monetary/exchange rate policy caused
the UK depression. We ﬁnd that the data do not support the monetary/exchange rate
explanation; most of the drop in output occurred before the monetary and exchange rate
shocks occurred, and the Depression lasted much longer than can be reasonably explained by
monetary/exchange rate shocks.
This negative assessment of the conventional monetary explanation leads us to evaluate
real shocks. The ﬁrst real shock we consider is a reduction in the length of the workweek. Weexamine the macroeconomic eﬀects of this restriction with a dynamic, general equilibrium
business cycle model to estimate the equilibrium path of the UK economy during the 1920s.
While the workweek shock explains the reduction in hours per worker, it does not explain the
depression. This is because the model predicts that employment rises substantially in response
to this shock and thus oﬀsets much of the decrease in hours per worker. This predicted
path of employment diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the actual large decrease and suggests that
some other large shock(s) depressed UK employment. We then present data on two policies
that reduced the incentive to work: large increases in unemployment beneﬁts and housing
subsidies that raised the cost to workers of relocating from depressed regions. We then present
a quantitative-theoretic analysis that suggests that policies that reduced incentives to work
may be the key to understanding the UK’s 20-year great depression.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes UK macroeconomic perfor-
mance during the interwar period. Section 3 assesses the standard monetary/exchange rate
explanation for the UK’s interwar depression. Section 4 presents a dynamic, general equilib-
rium model we use to assess the macroeconomic eﬀects of the restricted workweek. Section
5 summarizes the quantitative experiments. Section 6 argues that unemployment beneﬁts
and the regional concentration of unemployment contributed to the UK interwar depression.
Section 7 summarizes the UK unemployment beneﬁts system. Section 8 presents a summary
and conclusion.
2 .T h eU KE c o n o m yi nt h eI n t e r w a rP e r i o d
This section presents data on the aggregate variables that are central to the neoclassical
growth model: output and its components, labor input, and productivity. The source of all
2these data is Feinstein (1972); the appendix describes these data and the other data used in
this study in detail. We focus on the 1920s, since this is the decade in which the UK economy
does much worse than the world economy.
Figure 1 compares UK output and output for the rest of the world between 1905 and
1937.1 These data show that the UK and the rest-of-the-world (ROW) grow at roughly the
same rate up to World War I, but diverge sharply thereafter. The UK enters a depression
shortly after World War I and remains depressed throughout the interwar period; for example,
UK real GDP per adult falls about 1 percent between 1913 and 1929. In contrast, real GDP
per capita in the rest of the world rises over 30 percent during this same period. Since the
UK depression lasted so long, we also examine the UK output data relative to trend. Output
is measured in constant pounds, is divided by the adult population, and is detrended at the
historical average growth rate of 1.4 percent per year. It is also normalized to be 100 in
the year 1911, so deviations from 100 are deviations relative to trend. Table 1 shows that
output fell about 20 percent relative to trend shortly after the war and remained at roughly
that level throughout the 1920s. These data suggest that the shocks that depressed the UK
economy were UK-speciﬁc and were very persistent.
Table 1: UK Detrended Output (1911 = 100)
Year 1911 1919 1920 1921 1923 1925 1927 1929
Y 100 89 82 77 78 80 79 79
1The source of the data for the rest-of-the-world is Maddison (1995). This is the sum of real outputs in
a number of industrialized countries. The appendix describes the countries included in this measure. We
divide UK output by the adult population. Since this measure is not available for all the countries in our
rest-of-the-world category, we divide this measure of output by the total population.
3We now analyze changes in the components of output. Table 2 shows the shares
of output accounted for by consumption, investment, government spending, exports and
imports.
Table 2: UK Output Expenditure Shares
Year C/Y I/Y G/Y X/Y M/Y
1911 83 7 8 28 27
1919 76 6 18 16 16
1920 82 5 11 20 18
1921 81 7 12 17 17
1923 81 6 10 22 19
1925 79 11 9 21 20
1927 80 10 9 21 21
1929 80 10 9 21 20
There are no large changes in the fractions of output accounted for by the major
domestic GDP expenditure components. The ratio of consumption to output is about .8
in the 1920s, which is roughly unchanged from its prewar average. The ratio of investment
to output is somewhat higher in the 1920s than its pre-World War I average. Given that
this is a period of declining UK involvement in the British empire, this increase may reﬂect
a reallocation of expenditure from foreign investment to domestic investment. The ratio of
government spending to output is roughly unchanged in the 1920s relative to its pre-1920
average. The main diﬀerence in the foreign sector is that the shares of exports and imports
4are somewhat lower in the 1920s than before World War I. Trade is roughly balanced during
the 1920s, which is consistent with its long-term pre-World War I average. Taken together,
these output and expenditure share data suggest that a negative, permanent shock drove the
UK economy onto a lower steady state growth path in the 1920s.
To learn more about the nature of this depression, we conduct a growth accounting
exercise by decomposing the change in output into the fractions due to changes in total factor
productivity (TFP), changes in capital input, and changes in labor input. Since we will be
using a model that includes the length of the workweek, we measure TFP using the following
Cobb-Douglas technology: Yt = zthKθ
t E
1−θ
t ,where z is TFP, h is the length of the workweek,
K is the capital stock, and E is employment. We use factor shares of 0.3 for capital and 0.7
for employment.2
We show averages of these variables for sub-periods, since not all the data are consis-
tently available throughout the period. Table 3 shows that the decrease in output is entirely
due to lower labor input. Both TFP and the capital stock grow at about a 1 percent rate
during the interwar period. The combined growth in these two variables implies that output
should have increased by about 1.3 percent per year during this period. This suggests that
2Since there is no annual time series of aggregate hours in the U.K., we have constructed an annual
measure. We estimated this measure using data from British Historical Statistics and using micro data from
individual industries. British Historical Statistics reports measures of average hours per employee for 1873,
1913, 1924 and 1937. These data show that average hours were about 2,700/year in 1873 and in 1913, and
were about 2200/year in 1924 and 1937. Annual average hours are available for some of the building trades
industries. We also were able to infer an annual average hours per week series between 1914 and 1938 in
selected building occupations from weekly wage and average hourly earnings data from the Abstract of Labour
Statistics. The occupational data show that hours per week drop sharply between 1918 and 1921. Historical
sources claim that the 8-hour day movement and the introduction of paid holidays for manual workers led
to a sharp drop in hours worked during this period. To construct an annual hours worked series we assumed
that before the war, annual hours were constant at the 1914 level. We assumed that the drop that was
observed between 1913 and 1924 occurred in 1920 and 1921, with half the drop coming in each year. Between
1921 and 1924, we assumed that hours were constant at the 1924 level. Since average hours per year are
only marginally higher in 1937 (2300/year) we linearly interpolated between these years. We constructed the
aggregate measure of hours because there is no consistent annual time series for this variable.
5the shock(s) that depressed the UK economy did not aﬀect either productivity or capital
accumulation, but rather operated primarily through labor input.
Table 3: Changes in TFP, Capital and Labor
Years TFP Growth Capital Growth Hours/Worker Workers/Adult Hours/Adult
Pre-WWI 0.9% N.A. 2700 .68 100
1920-38 0.9% 1.1% 2200 .61 73
Hours worked per adult was about 27 percent below its prewar level. Average hours
per worker fell from about 2700 per year before World War I to about 2200 in 1924 and
remained at roughly that level in the 1930s. This reduction was partially due to unions’
demands for shorter work days and also vacations. Much of this decrease in hours per worker
occurred shortly after World War I - average hours for about 40 percent of employees fell
from about 55 hours per week to about 47 hours per week in 1919 and 1920.
The workweek restriction sheds light on why hours per worker fell, but makes the
employment fall seem even more puzzling. This is because the restricted workweek would
tend to increase employment, as households would presumably substitute workers for hours
per worker. In contrast, the average fraction of the adult population working falls from about
0.68 prior to World War I to about .60 in 1920 and remains at roughly that level during the
interwar period. This indicates that the key to understanding the UK interwar depression
is ﬁnding a large and persistent shock that depressed employment. We next evaluate some
possible candidates for this shock, beginning with monetary/exchange rate shocks.
63. The Monetary Explanation of the UK Depression
The consensus view is that monetary and exchange rate policies were the primary
causes of the UK Depression. This section evaluates the monetary/exchange rate explanation
but ﬁnds that these factors do not plausibly account for the UK interwar depression.
Before presenting this evaluation, we brieﬂy review the standard monetary/exchange
rate explanation which is largely a sticky wage/deﬂation story due to Keynes (1932). He
argued that post-World War I deﬂationary policy depressed the UK economy because nominal
wages were imperfectly ﬂexible. According to Keynes, the UK made two policy mistakes: it
contracted the money supply too much, and it set the pound/dollar exchange rate at too
high a level.
Keynes argued that deﬂation raised real wages and reduced labor input. He also
argued that the exchange rate, which was pegged at $4.86 per pound in 1925, and high real
wages reduced British exports. Speciﬁcally, he argued that the high real wage prevented the
domestic price from falling enough so that British exports were competitively priced with
the $4.86 exchange rate. Keynes recommended against nominal wage reductions and instead
advocated ending deﬂationary monetary policy and adopting a pegged exchange rate of about
$4.40 per pound. The crux of Keynes’ argument is summarized in the following passages:
“If you ﬁx the exchange rate at this gold parity...you are committing yourself to
a policy of forcing down money wages and the cost of living to the necessary
extent. We must warn you that this policy is not easy. It is certain to involve
unemployment and industrial disputes. If as some people think real wages were
already too high a year ago, that is all the worse, because the amount of the
7necessary wage reductions in terms of money will be all the greater....You are
intensifying unemployment deliberately in order to reduce wages (p. 253). It is a
grave criticism of our way of managing our economic aﬀairs that (wage reductions
in and of themselves) seem to any one to be a reasonable proposal” (Keynes 1932,
p. 260).
Keynes’ monetary/exchange rate story is cited as the leading explanation for the UK
Great Depression in several recent analyses, including Hatton (1994), Dimsdale (1981), Mog-
gridge (1972), and Garside (1990). There are four reasons, however, why we ﬁnd that mon-
etary/exchange rate shocks do not plausibly account for the UK interwar depression. We
present each of these in turn.
A. Problem 1: Timing - Depression Occurred Before Deﬂation
The ﬁrst reason is timing: the depression begins well before the monetary contraction.
Table 4 shows that most of the decrease in output occurred while the money stock and the
price level were still rising: output fell about 18 percent relative to trend between 1918 and
1920, while the money supply and the GDP deﬂator rose about 30 percent and 43 percent,
respectively.3 The money stock and price level do not fall until 1921. The fact that almost all
of the output decrease occurs before the monetary contraction indicates that unanticipated
monetary shocks are not the key factor that depressed the UK economy.
3The data on the money supply and the deﬂator are from Friedman and Schwartz (1982).
8Table 4: Changes in Real Output, Money,
and the Price Level (1918 = 100)
Year Real GDP Money Price
1912 98.9 50.3 53.2
1918 100.0 100.0 100.0
1919 89.7 117.0 117.5
1920 82.5 129.8 142.7
1921 77.9 127.4 126.9
1922 78.8 120.4 106.9
1923 79.4 115.2 94.3
1929 79.7 117.7 92.6
B. Problem 2: Persistence
The second drawback to the monetary story is persistence: the interwar depression
lasted much longer than can be reasonably accounted for by monetary shocks. Monetary
business cycle theory predicts that monetary shocks have only transient eﬀects on employment
and output. If the monetary shock is identiﬁed as either the decline in the money stock or
t h ed e c l i n ei nt h ep r i c el e v e l ,t h e nt h ee ﬀects of these shocks should have died out shortly
after 1923, when both the money supply and the price level are near their trough values.
Alternatively, if the monetary shock is identiﬁe da st h eh i g hr e a lw a g ea si nK e y n e s ’s t o r y ,
then theory suggests the eﬀects of the wage shock should have died out shortly after 1921,
which is the only year in the interwar period in which real wages were above their normal
9level. Figure 2 shows a measure of the real wage relative to its normal level, which we measure
as the real wage relative to total factor productivity between 1910 and 1938. The ﬁgure shows
that except for 1921, the real wage relative to productivity in the 1920s is about the same
during the post-World War I depression as in the pre-World War I period. These data suggest
that monetary shocks do not explain the persistence of the UK depression.
C. Problem 3: Worldwide Deﬂation but no Worldwide Depression
The third drawback to the monetary story is the international evidence: during the
1920s, many other countries experienced signiﬁcant deﬂations, but did not suﬀer major de-
pressions. For example, the U.S. price level fell about 20 percent between 1919 and 1922, but
real U.S. per capita output grew over 20 percent between 1919 and 1929. The French price
level fell 22 percent between 1920 and 1922, but real French per capita output grew over 25
percent between 1920 and 1929. The fact that other countries had major postwar deﬂations
but also grew substantially indicates that deﬂation by itself does not explain why the UK
economy was depressed during the 1920s.
D. Problem 4: No Increase in Relative Price of British Exports
The fourth drawback to the monetary story is that the relative price of British exports
did not rise during the interwar period. This fact is inconsistent with Keynes’ exchange rate
story, which states that the relative price of British exports rose substantially during the
interwar period and reduced exports. We measure this relative price by forming the ratio of
the price index of UK exports - multiplied by the dollar-pound exchange rate - to the US
GDP deﬂator. This measure shows how the price of UK exports - multiplied by the exchange
rate - relative to the domestic US market basket of goods changed during the interwar period:
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X e/PUS.4 This relative price did not change much during the interwar period. Table 5
shows that this price is only 4.5 percent higher during the 1920s than during the 1890-1911
period. The table also shows the real exchange rate, which is an alternative measure of
this relative price. This is the ratio of the price of UK domestic goods - multiplied by the
exchange rate - to the price of US goods: P UKe/PUS. The table shows that this measure is
unchanged between the 1920s and the prewar period. The fact that neither of these relative
p r i c em e a s u r e sr o s es i g n i ﬁcantly during the interwar depression stands in contrast to the
Keynesian view and suggests that an overvalued exchange rate is not the key shock that kept
employment low during the interwar period.5
Table 5: Real Price of British Exports









We conclude that the standard monetary/exchange rate story does not plausibly ac-
count for the 1920s depression. The timing of the shocks is not right, the shocks are not
suﬃciently persistent; other countries experienced large deﬂations, but there were no other
persistent depressions; and the price of UK exports relative to US goods did not rise.
This negative assessment of the monetary story leads us to examine the eﬀects of real
s h o c k s .W ef o c u so nt h ee ﬀect of the cut in the workweek. This allows us to estimate how
4We use the US deﬂator since the US was a major trading partner of the UK, and the data are of relatively
high quality.
5The UK price data are from Feinstein (1972). The US deﬂator is from Friedman and Schwartz (1982).
11much employment should have changed in response to this large policy shock. We conduct this
evaluation by developing a dynamic, general equilibrium model with a ﬁxed cost of working
which leads to an optimal level of employment and an optimal length of the workweek.
4. The Model Economy
This section presents the model economy we use to analyze the eﬀect of the workweek
restriction. We begin by summarizing the environment. There is an inﬁnitely lived repre-
sentative family with many identical members. The household has preferences over a single
physical consumption good and household leisure. To focus on the steady state eﬀects of
changes in the workweek, we abstract from uncertainty and open economy issues.
Our framework is similar to the Hansen (1985)-Rogerson (1988) formulation in which
individuals either work full time or do not work at all. We modify this formulation by
explicitly including a ﬁxed cost of working. We choose a simple speciﬁcation of this cost in
our benchmark model such that each household member who works incurs a ﬁxed, linear







ψlog(1 − ¯ h) − φ
i
+( 1− et)[ψlog(1)]}, (1)
where c denotes household consumption, e is the fraction of family members working, ¯ h is
t h el e n g t ho ft h ew o r k d a y ,a n dφ is the ﬁxed cost of working. The resource constraint and
the capital accumulation equation are given by
Yt = ¯ hK
θ
t (AtEt)
1−θ = Ct + It
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + It,K 0 given
6The ﬁxed cost could alternatively be modelled as a resource cost or a time cost. The results are not
sensitive to this choice, however.
12where Y is aggregate output, K is the aggregate capital stock, E is the aggregate employment
rate, and A is labor augmenting technological progress, which is given by
At =( 1+γ)
t.
We conduct the analysis with a stationary version of the model, in which all growing
variables are divided by At.
5. Quantitative Experiments
We now use this model to analyze the UK macroeconomic performance in the 1920s.
The ﬁrst experiment provides a neoclassical benchmark for the UK economy during the 1920s
without the change in the workweek. In this ﬁrst experiment, both the length of the workweek
and the fraction of individuals who work are optimally chosen. We contrast the results of
this experiment with a second experiment in which the workweek is restricted to be below
the optimal level.
To parameterize the model, we choose the value of the household’s discount factor (β)
so that the interest rate along the steady state growth path is about 7 percent. We choose
the leisure parameter B and the ﬁxed cost φ such that along the steady state growth path
the representative household spends about 1/3 of its discretionary time endowment working
and that the employment rate in the model is equal to the pre-World War I average rate of 68
percent. We choose the growth rate of labor-augmenting technological progress (γ) so that
output, consumption, and investment all grow at 1.1 percent, which is the average growth
rate of total factor productivity in the data. The depreciation rate (δ) is 6 percent per year.
The parameter θ is chosen so that labor’s share of income is 70 percent of output.
13We compute the perfect foresight competitive equilibrium path of this economy, given
an initial condition for the capital stock, which we estimate to be about 12 percent below its
prewar steady-state growth path level in 1919.
A. A Benchmark Experiment: Fast Recovery
This ﬁrst experiment shows the predicted UK recovery from World War I with no
change in the workweek. Table 6 shows the model’s predictions for output and employment
during the 1920s. The theory predicts that without the workweek restriction, the UK should
have recovered quickly after the war - just like the rest of the world - with employment above
its steady state level throughout the decade. This prediction of a robust recovery diﬀers
signiﬁcantly from the data. We therefore next assess what fraction of the depression can be
accounted for by the one large and permanent labor market shock we have identiﬁed so far -
the workweek restriction adopted shortly after World War II.








14B. How Did the “8 Hour Day” Aﬀect the UK Economy?
Trade unions began negotiating a shorter work day beginning in 1919. The “eight-
hour day” movement continued through 1920. Aldcroft (1970) reports that about 7 million
workers received shorter hours from this movement, and that average hours worked fell about
11 percent - from 54 hours per week to 48 hours per week - between 1919 and 1921, and
average hours fell about 15 percent between 1913 and the late 1920s. Aldcroft also notes that
there were very few hours reductions in the period after 1921.
We therefore model this decrease in the workweek by exogenously ﬁxing the length of
the workweek to be 15 percent less than the optimal steady state level. All other aspects of
the experiment remain the same. Table 7 shows the time paths of output and employment
relative to their nondistorted steady state levels. The main ﬁnding is that employment rises
substantially in response to the workweek restriction, as households substitute workers for
hours per worker. The steady state employment level with the restricted workweek is about
20 percent above the nondistorted steady state level, and the steady state level of output is
about 3 percent lower than its nondistorted steady state level.
15Table 7: The Predicted Path of the UK Economy -







The quantitative eﬀect of the workweek restriction in this model depends on the spec-
iﬁcation of the ﬁxed cost function. The 20 percent increase predicted by this simple model is
probably too high, because the model assumes that the marginal cost of working is constant.
We therefore evaluate the robustness of the results to two alternative speciﬁcations of the
ﬁxed cost function that allow for the ﬁxed cost to rise as the fraction employed rises.
The ﬁrst alternative speciﬁcation we use is a quadratic function rather than a linear
function. The cost speciﬁcation is thus modelled as e2
tµφ rather than etφ,w h e r et h ev a l u e
of µ is chosen so that the steady state employment rate without the workweek restriction
is identical across the two cost speciﬁcations. This quadratic speciﬁcation predicts that em-
ployment should have increased about 18 percent in response to the workweek cut, compared
to the 20 percent increase predicted by the linear cost speciﬁcation.
The second alternative speciﬁcation is that the cost is linear in the fraction employed,
but that the ﬁxed cost rises if the employment rate rises above 68 percent, which was the
pre-World War I average. The cost function is therefore given by etφ for et ≤ .68 and is equal
16to etφ
∗ for et >. 68. This speciﬁcation captures the idea that increasing employment above
a threshold level requires employing individuals who have higher ﬁxed costs of working. For
example, married women with young children probably have a higher ﬁx e dc o s to fw o r k i n g
than men. Cogan (1981) estimates that the ﬁxed cost of working for women is about 28
percent of their earnings. We are unaware of comparable estimates for males, but if we assume
that the ﬁxed cost of working for men is about one hour per day (this includes commuting
time and time to prepare for work) relative to an eight hour workday, then the ﬁxed cost
of working for men is about 1/8 or 12.5 percent of their earnings. This is about 50 percent
smaller than Cogan’s estimate for women. We use these numbers to specify the two diﬀerent
ﬁx e dc o s t si nt h em o d e l .W et h u sc h o o s eaﬁxed cost for individuals brought in to increase
the employment rate above 68 percent to be twice as high as that for other individuals. This
speciﬁcation of diﬀerential ﬁxed costs leads the workweek restriction to increase the steady
state employment rate in our model by about 10 percent. Table 8 presents the transition
path for this experiment.
This analysis of the restricted workweek indicates that the UK employment rate should
have increased during the interwar period, although it is diﬃcult to estimate the magnitude
of this increase. The most plausible of our three estimates is a 10 percent increase. This
ﬁnding indicates that another large negative shock to the labor market is responsible for
the 10 percent drop in the UK employment rate. Since the ratio of wages to total factor
productivity was relatively unchanged between the 1920s and the prewar period, it is unlikely
that the shock was changes in unionization or labor bargaining power that would have aﬀected
labor demand. Instead, this constancy of the real wage suggests that the shock aﬀected labor
17supply.7
Table 8: The Predicted Path of the UK Economy -







6. Unemployment Beneﬁts, the Regional Concentration of Unem-
ployment, and the Depression
This section argues that generous unemployment beneﬁts and the regional concen-
tration of declining UK industrial sectors were key contributing factors to the UK interwar
depression. This view stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom, which is summa-
rized by Eichengreen (1987): “Although Keynesians have conceded that some small portion
of interwar unemployment may be explicable on these grounds, few have sympathy for the
notion that the insurance system contributed signiﬁcantly to the magnitude of the problem.”
This conventional wisdom comes from an empirical debate between Benjamin and Kochin
(BK) (1979, 1982), who presented evidence that unemployment beneﬁts raised unemploy-
7The relative constancy of the prewar and postwar real UK wage is consistent with the steady state
prediction of our model, because the steady state capital/labor ratio is pinned down in the Euler equation
for capital by the household’s discount rate and the physical depreciation rate on capital.
18ment substantially, and a number of critics who empirically criticized BK’s ﬁndings.8 In the
appendix we discuss this debate in more detail.
Our approach in addressing this question diﬀers from that used in the previous debate.
In contrast to BK’s critics, our argument is not based solely on unemployment beneﬁts, but
rather focuses on the interaction between these beneﬁts, the regional concentration of declin-
ing industries, and government policies that raised the cost of relocation. Moreover, we use a
fully articulated general equilibrium model to focus on the incentive eﬀects of unemployment
beneﬁts, and we use our model to quantitatively assess the eﬀect of the observed increase
in beneﬁts on employment. As we discuss below, this general equilibrium approach leads
us to draw a very diﬀerent conclusion regarding the importance of government policies that
changed the incentive to work.
7. A Summary of the UK Unemployment Beneﬁts System
Unemployment insurance was introduced in 1911 and was expanded signiﬁcantly after
World War I, in terms of the level of both beneﬁts and coverage. This section presents a
summary of UK unemployment insurance, including a discussion of beneﬁt levels, the lack of
experience rating, eligibility requirements, and the duration of beneﬁts.
Unemployment beneﬁts were initially provided in the Unemployment Insurance Act of
1911, which extended beneﬁts to 15% of the workforce. These were primarily manual laborers,
8BK’s main regression of unemployment on the ratio of beneﬁts-to-average-wages and deviation of log
output from trend is reproduced here:
U = .19 + 18.3 ∗ (B/W) − 90.0 ∗ (log(Q/Q∗)
(2.64) (4.46) (−8.30)
R2 = .84, ¯ R2 = .82, D-W =2 .18,S E=1 .90.
The JPE (vol. 9, No. 2) published 4 critiques of BK’s paper, along with BK’s reply. Other critical
discussions of BK include Eichengreen (1987) and Hatton (1994).
19many of whom were already covered by trade union insurance programs. The beneﬁtl e v e l
speciﬁed in the Act was a ﬁxed amount which depended upon age (16-17, 18-20, and greater
than 20) and sex. It was also fairly modest and was eroded by the inﬂation that took place
during WWI. The Act also speciﬁed a maximum duration of 15 weeks per year.
Unemployment compensation rose substantially after World War I. This increase was
provided through the Out-of-Work Donation, which was available for a short period imme-
diately after WWI and was a noncontributory beneﬁtp a i do nar e l a t i v e l yg e n e r o u ss c a l e . 9
It was intended for returning soldiers, but was quickly expanded to cover virtually all adults
who registered as unemployed. This was replaced by the Unemployment Insurance Act of
1920, which increased weekly beneﬁts by nearly 40% relative to the level in the 1911 Act and
formally extended coverage to almost all privately employed workers (the main exceptions
were agricultural workers and domestics).10 The 1920 Act raised the maximum duration of
beneﬁts to 26 weeks. This duration limit was not enforced, however, because of high un-
employment during 1920: “The contributory basis of the insurance scheme was abandoned
within 6 months of the 1920 Act going into operation” (Deacon 1976, p. 14). The duration
limit was formally abolished in 1928.
Figure 3 shows unemployment beneﬁts measured as the “replacement rate” - the ratio
of unemployment beneﬁts for a married worker with two children to the average wage for
manual workers (B/W). The replacement rate rises considerably after the 1920 Act and is
9The beneﬁts associated with the out-of-work donation were originally set to 24 shillings for men and
20 shillings for women and were increased in December of 1918 to 29 shillings for men and 25 shillings for
women. (Source: Burns 1941, p. 3-7.) We have estimated the ratio of beneﬁts to average wages under the
donation to have been .47 in 1918 and 1919, and .39 in 1920.
10The beneﬁt in 1911 was a uniform 7 shillings (7s) per week. In 1919 it was increased to 11s per week.
In 1920 the beneﬁtw a sd i ﬀerentiated between men (whose beneﬁt was increased to 15s) and women (whose
beneﬁt was increased to 12s). In 1921 beneﬁts for dependents were introduced, and the beneﬁts were frequently
changed thereafter in an upward direction, except in 1931. (Source: Burns 1941, p. 3-7.)
20around 50% or higher during much of the interwar period.11 This replacement rate almost
surely understates the eﬀective relative beneﬁt because individuals tend to experience large
decreases in their market wage following a layoﬀ. For example, Jacobson, Lalonde, and
Sullivan (1993) show that workers who separate from their jobs during periods of high layoﬀs
initially suﬀer a 45 percent decrease in earnings and also show that their earnings remain
25 percent below their previous wage ﬁve years later. This ﬁnding suggests that interwar
unemployment beneﬁts may have been roughly comparable to the market wage of displaced
workers. Given these high beneﬁt levels and the large number of unemployed, government
expenditures on beneﬁts rose from roughly zero before World War I to about 4 percent of
GDP by 1930.
In addition to the high level of beneﬁts, there are other key characteristics of the UK
interwar beneﬁts system that signiﬁcantly changed the incentive to work. We summarize
these issues here; BK (1979) discuss them in detail. The ﬁrst is that there was no experience
rating: unemployment insurance contributions were independent of workers’ and ﬁrms’ past
histories. The second is that beneﬁts were independent of a worker’s past wage. This feature
signiﬁcantly changed incentives for low-skill/low wage workers who tended to have more
frequent unemployment spells than high skill/high wage workers. The third feature is that
beneﬁts could be collected indeﬁnitely and were payable for unemployment spells as short
as one day. These features suggest that both moral hazard and adverse selection may have
11The levels of employment and unemployment among workers covered by the Act was tracked through
the requirement that workers keep an employment/unemployment book. When an insured person became
unemployed, he got a book from the employer and “lodged” it with the employment exchange. Upon getting
work, the person retrieved the book and gave it to the employer, who aﬃxed stamps for each week of
employment. Books expired in July of each year, at which time they were exchanged for new books at the
employment exchange.
21been pervasive. Modern unemployment insurance systems diﬀer signiﬁcantly along these
dimensions precisely because they try to limit the importance of these incentive problems.
While the UK unemployment insurance system reduced the incentive to work, beneﬁts
varied across demographic groups. In particular, groups with lower beneﬁts tended to have
lower unemployment rates. For example, BK (1979) document that juveniles - who received
lower unemployment beneﬁts - had much lower unemployment rates and that unemployment
among married women fell substantially after the October 1931 “Anomalies Legislation”
signiﬁcantly raised married women’s contributory requirements.
High unemployment compensation, however, is not the whole story behind the inter-
war depression. This is because employment recovered to nearly its pre-World War I average
in the early 1950s, despite the continuation of high unemployment beneﬁts.12 Table 9 shows
variations in the replacement rate, the unemployment rate, and employment per adult be-
tween 1920 and the 1950s.
The replacement rate falls from about 0.56 in the 1930s to about 0.38-0.43 in the
1950s.13 This suggests that beneﬁts in the 1950s were lower than those in the 1930s, but
roughly comparable to the average for the 1920s. These data indicate that some other factor
is required for understanding the diﬀerence between the interwar period and the post-World
War II period.
In summary, we ﬁnd that unemployment beneﬁts rose considerably after World War
12Metcalf, Nickell, and Floros (1982) initially pointed out that beneﬁts remained high during the 1950s,
but that unemployment rates were low. BK (1982) responded to this critique by noting changes in the
composition of the unemployed and in unemployment reporting. We therefore focus on employment, rather
than unemployment.
13There is a lack of consensus regarding the beneﬁt-to-wage ratio in the postwar period. Metcalf, Nickell,
and Floros (1982) report numbers that are much closer to the interwar level (.43 for 1951-57 and .54 for
1958-65), while Maki and Spindler (1975), using data from the Department of Health and Social Security,
report lower numbers.
22I, but that employment recovers after World War II, despite the continuation of relatively
generous beneﬁts. A successful theory of the UK interwar depression thus requires a general
equilibrium that predicts low employment during the interwar period, but high employment
during the post-World War II period.
Table 9: Unemployment Insurance and the Labor Market
Replacement Unemployment Rates Employment
Year Ratio14 Ormerod and Worswick Feinstein Per Adult
1920 0.15 3.9 2.0 0.68
1921-24 0.35 13.3 9.1 0.60
1925-29 0.48 11.1 7.7 0.60
1930-34 0.52 19.2 13.6 0.60
1935-38 0.56 13.1 9.4 0.63
1948-54 0.38 - 0.43 - 1.3 0.67
A. Sectoral Shocks and a Consistent Accounting of the Interwar and Post-World
War II Periods
Accounting for the interwar depression requires an additional shock that further re-
duces the incentive to work during the during the interwar period. Our basic story for this
interwar shock is a diﬀerence in sectoral shocks between the periods. There were large, neg-
ative, sector-speciﬁc shocks that hit the UK after World War I, but not after World War II.
Given this hypothesis, we conduct two analyses. The ﬁrst evaluates the steady state eﬀects of
14These data are from Ormerod and Worswick (1982) for the interwar period and Maki and Spindler (1975)
(ﬁrst number) and Metcalf, Nickell, and Floros (1982) (second number) for the post-WWII period.
23unemployment beneﬁts without any sectoral shocks. This provides an estimate of the eﬀects
of this policy for the post-World War II period, in which there were no major sectoral shocks.
Our main ﬁnding is that the model predicts a steady state employment level that is very
similar to the post-World War II UK employment level. Given this positive ﬁnding regarding
the role of unemployment beneﬁts, we then discuss our sectoral shock hypothesis in detail
and present evidence supporting this hypothesis.
We begin by evaluating the eﬀects of the unemployment subsidy without sectoral
shocks. This requires adding this subsidy to the model developed in section 4. We do this by
specifying that beneﬁts are ﬁnanced through lump sum transfers and are paid proportionately
to the fraction of family members who do not work. The representative household therefore
maximizes equation (1) subject to the following period budget constraint:
wtet + rtkt + Tt + st(1 − et) − ct − xt ≥ 0.
This budget constraint states that wage income (wtet) plus capital income (rtkt) plus
lump sum transfers (Tt) plus family unemployment beneﬁts (st(1−et)) are suﬃcient to ﬁnance
consumption (ct) and investment (xt).
Unemployment beneﬁts reduce employment in our model by subsidizing non-market
activities. The ﬁrst order condition that governs the fraction of family members working
shows that the subsidy reduces employment by reducing the market wage rate net of the
subsidy:
ψlog(1 − ¯ h) − φ = uct(wt − st).
Estimating the impact of the subsidy requires choosing the rate of unemployment
beneﬁts (st).W ec h o o s et h eb e n e ﬁt rate so that in the steady state the total value of beneﬁts
24in the model (st(1 − et)) is equal to the total amount of beneﬁts paid in the data, which is
about 4 percent of GNP. Given this value of the subsidy, it is straightforward to calculate
the impact of the subsidy on employment. This is because the steady state capital-labor
ratio is unaﬀected by the subsidy, which implies that the steady state wage rate is also
unaﬀected. This in turn implies that the marginal utility of consumption must rise to oﬀset
the subsidy. Given our preference speciﬁcation of log utility in consumption, and separability
between consumption and leisure, it follows that the percentage decrease in the steady state
employment rate is equal to the percentage decrease in the wage net of the subsidy. Therefore,
our model predicts that the observed increase in unemployment beneﬁts reduces steady state
employment about 10 percent.
Given our estimates of the eﬀect of the restricted workweek and the eﬀect of unem-
ployment beneﬁts, we now use the model to estimate how much employment should have
changed after World War II. We ﬁnd that our model predicts that the post-World War II
employment rate is very close to the data: 0.68 in the model, compared to 0.67 in the data.
This prediction reﬂects the roughly oﬀsetting eﬀects of the restricted workweek and unem-
ployment beneﬁts. The restricted workweek drives employment up about 10 percent, while
unemployment beneﬁts drive employment down by the same amount. This estimate, reﬂect-
ing the combined aﬀects of the workweek restriction and unemployment beneﬁts, suggests
that the theory may explain why the employment rate in the 1950s was about the same as it
was before World War I.
However, the sharp diﬀerence between interwar and post-World War II employment
indicates that beneﬁts are only part of the story. We therefore discuss how large, negative
sectoral shocks could have further reduced the incentive to work during the interwar period
25relative to the post-World War II period. We discuss this issue in the spirit of Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998).
These authors show how unemployment insurance can lead to changes in unem-
ployment over time because of changes in the marginal value of unemployment beneﬁts.
Ljungqvist and Sargent develop a model in which the marginal value of a given level of un-
employment beneﬁts depends on the relative volatility of the shocks to worker productivity.
During periods of high volatility a relatively large fraction of workers receive large negative
shocks to their productivity. This led those workers receiving negative shocks to prefer un-
employment to retaining their job at the lower wage. The marginal value of unemployment
beneﬁts during these periods is thus relatively high. Alternatively, relatively few workers will
experience large negative shocks to their productivity during low volatility periods. Thus, the
marginal value of unemployment beneﬁts during these low volatility periods is low. Ljungqvist
and Sargent argue that this model - together with their estimates of larger, negative shocks
in the post-1970 period - can explain why European unemployment was low in the 1950s and
1960s, but high after the 1970s, despite the fact that unemployment compensation was about
t h es a m ei nt h e s et w op e r i o d s .
It follows that the Ljungqvist and Sargent theory predicts that unemployment would
be higher after World War I than after World War II - despite similar beneﬁt levels - if the
variance of idiosyncratic shocks to human capital was higher during the earlier period. There
are considerable data that are consistent with this view. In particular, there were large,
negative sectoral shocks to British industries immediately after World War I that would
be expected to drive down the value-marginal products of the workers in these sectors and
thereby increase the marginal value of unemployment beneﬁts. Moreover, these negative
26shocks were regionally concentrated, and government-subsidized housing policies that raised
the cost of worker relocation raised the marginal value of these beneﬁts even further. We now
discuss these post-World War I negative sectoral shocks.
A number of Britain’s “staples” industries - including coal, steel, and textiles - declined
signiﬁcantly after World War I. This decline was primarily caused by large decreases in
exports. For example, Alford (1981) notes that coal exports fell almost 70 percent between
1913 and 1921. These reductions in exports are likely due to Britain’s loss of comparative
advantage in producing these goods. This loss of comparative advantage reﬂects post-World
War I British productivity decreases, postwar productivity growth in competing countries,
and higher world trade barriers.
Regarding productivity, labor productivity in the coal industry between 1920-29 was
only 3 percent higher than in 1912, after correcting for the 15 percent decrease in the work-
week. Some researchers (e.g., Alford, 1981) argue that productivity decreases were caused
by industry conﬂict. There were two major coal strikes in 1921 and 1926. After correcting
for the shorter post-World War I workweek, labor productivity fell about 25 percent and 38
percent, respectively, relative to its 1912 level, during these two years.15
Regarding the eﬀects of trade barriers and foreign competition on British exports,
Alford (1981) cites increased competition facing the staples industries and tariﬀ protection
which closed previously open markets. Youngson (1967) cites the loss of Russian markets
and competition from Poland for sales to Scandinavia as adversely aﬀecting the coal indus-
try during the 1920s. Youngson also discusses how Britain’s textile industry was adversely
15These ﬁgures were computed using data in Mitchell and Deane (1962). The data are measured as output
per worker. The postwar data are corrected for the 15 percent decrease in the workweek, but are not corrected
for normal trend productivity growth.
27aﬀected by increased protectionism by China, Japan and India, and by textile sales from
these countries into Britain’s other export markets. Aldcroft (1986) notes that cotton tex-
tile exports fell by more than 50 percent between 1913 and 1922. These large reductions in
export demand suggest that the workers in these sectors suﬀered negative shocks to their
value-marginal productivities.
The contraction of these export markets coincided with high unemployment. Aldcroft
(1986) notes that manufacturing, mining and construction accounted for about 45% of British
employment in 1929, but accounted for about 75% of all unemployment that year. Table 10
shows that unemployment in a number of industries in these sectors was higher than the
aggregate unemployment rate.
The concentration of unemployment in these declining sectors indicates that the marginal
value of unemployment beneﬁts was relatively high during the interwar period for a large
fraction of British workers. Another key factor that raised the marginal value of beneﬁts
is the regional concentration of the declining industries, combined with government housing
subsidies that raised the cost of moving.
Government housing and rent subsidies raised the marginal value of beneﬁts even
further by raising the cost to workers of relocating to sectors with better employment op-
portunities. Many of the declining industries were highly concentrated in Northern England,
while the new, growing industries were concentrated in the Midlands. For example, Aldcroft
(1986) reports that 1929 unemployment rates ranged from a high of 18.8 percent in Wales,
which was dominated by the coal industry, to a low of 3.8 percent in Southeast England and
London. The 1929 unemployment rate in Southern England was 6.4 percent, compared to
12.9 percent unemployment in Northern England and Wales.
28Table 10: Average Unemployment Rates Among Insured Workers:
Selected Industries, 1924-29
Source: Mitchell and Deane (1962)
Industry Unemployment Rate
Coal Mining 15%




T h i sc o n c e n t r a t i o no fu n e m p l o y m e n ti nt h eN o r t hd i ﬀers sharply from prewar patterns,
in which unemployment was high in London (7.8 percent) and low in Wales and Scotland (3.1
percent and 1.8 percent, respectively). This regional concentration raised the marginal value
of unemployment beneﬁts because local housing subsidies raised the costs of relocating from
high unemployment regions. BK note that rent control and housing subsidies were introduced
after World War I and that these subsidies were lost once a household relocated.
The combination of large negative sectoral shocks to Britain’s traditional industries,
high regional concentration of industry, and low worker mobility suggests that workers ex-
perienced large negative shocks to their wages and f a c e dh i g hr e l o c a t i o nc o s t si ft h e ym o v e d
to regions with better employment opportunities. These factors raised the marginal value
of high, permanent unemployment insurance beneﬁts and thus changed the incentives facing
workers in these industries. High beneﬁts, low market wages, and high relocation costs could
16The ﬁrst number is the average for Steel Melting and Iron Pudding, and Iron and Steel Rolling and
Forging. The second number is the average for General Engineering: Engineers’ Iron and Steel Founding.
29have led some of these workers to prefer unemployment during the interwar period. But while
this combination of factors was present during the interwar period, it was not present during
the post-World War II period.
Ak e yd i ﬀerence between the two postwar periods is that sectoral shocks appear to be
much smaller after World War II. In particular, increased foreign competition, which signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀected Britain’s staples industries after World War I, did not aﬀect British industry
after World War II. For example, Broadberry (1997, p. 13) argues that Britain emerged from
WWII highly dependent on its home and Commonwealth producers and that this enabled
Britain to avoid competition with US and German producers until Britain joined the EEC in
1973. These large diﬀerences in postwar sectoral shocks between the 1920s and 1950s along
with policies that distorted worker relocation suggest that the big employment diﬀerences
between the interwar period and the immediate post-WWII period may be consistent with
government policies that changed the incentive to work.
8. Summary and Conclusion
The UK was depressed for 20 years between the end of World War I and the start
of World War II. During this period output per adult was roughly 20 percent below its pre-
World War I trend. This decrease was entirely due to labor input, rather than decreases in
productivity or the capital stock. Labor input fell more than 25 percent, reﬂecting declines
in both hours per worker and in employment.
Our analysis suggests that Keynes’ views about the importance of Britain’s declining
export sectors during the interwar period were indeed correct - much of the employment loss
in Britain was concentrated in these industries. However, our analysis raises questions about
30Keynes’ views of the causes of Britain’s interwar depression. Keynes argued that imper-
fectly ﬂexible wages, deﬂation, and an over-valued exchange rate caused Britain’s interwar
depression. We ﬁnd that the standard Keynesian monetary/exchange rate explanation of
this depression is unconvincing, however. Most of the decrease in output occurred before the
negative monetary and exchange rate shocks, and the depression lasted much longer than can
be reasonably explained by modern monetary business cycle theory. We also investigated the
macroeconomic eﬀects of real shocks, including a 15 percent cut in the workweek. This shock
depressed hours per worker substantially and depressed output moderately, but should have
led to a signiﬁcant increase in employment. This prediction of employment growth stands in
contrast to the observed 11 percent employment decrease.
We conclude that the key to unlocking the mystery of the UK interwar depression
is ﬁnding a large, negative, persistent shock to labor supply. The theory should be able
to account for depressed interwar employment and normal post-World War II employment,
despite roughly the same level of unemployment beneﬁts during both periods.
We ﬁnd that the observed level of beneﬁts correctly predicts the level of post-World
War II UK employment. This leads us to conclude that unemployment beneﬁts, combined
with large, negative sectoral shocks and government policies that raised the cost of worker
relocation may account for the interwar depression. The impact of beneﬁts was higher dur-
ing the interwar period, given the large negative shocks that hit Britain’s export industries
immediately after World War I. Beneﬁts were particularly attractive to workers in export in-
dustries, because they experienced large negative shocks to their productivities and also faced
high costs of leaving depressed regions due to local housing subsidy policies. Our future work
will focus on quantitatively analyzing the implications of these shocks for the interwar period.
319. Appendix
A. The Prior Debate
The prior debate on the importance of the UK unemployment beneﬁts system in
Britain’s high interwar unemployment rate centered on the work of Benjamin and Kochin
(1979, 1982) (BK) and the reactions of their critics. BK present qualitative and quantita-
tive arguments that unemployment beneﬁts raised UK unemployment. Qualitatively, they
noted three aspects of the beneﬁts system that could lead to high unemployment: insurance
contributions were independent of either workers’ or ﬁrms’ past histories, beneﬁts were inde-
pendent of a worker’s past wage, and beneﬁts could be collected indeﬁnitely and were payable
for unemployment spells as short as one day. The lack of experience rating, the long-term
availability of beneﬁts, and eligibility based on very short spells suggest that both moral
hazard and adverse selection problems could have been pervasive.
Benjamin and Kochin’s (BK) quantitative arguments are based on three pieces of
evidence. The best known piece of evidence is a time series regression of the aggregate unem-
ployment rate regressed on the B/W ratio and the deviation of output from trend in which
the coeﬃcient on beneﬁts was sizeable and signiﬁcantly positive.17 The B/W regression
coeﬃcient indicates that the large increase in unemployment beneﬁts raised the unemploy-
ment rate by as much as nine percentage points during the interwar period. The other two
pieces of evidence are about diﬀerences in unemployment rates and beneﬁts and/or eligibility
17Their main regression of unemployment on the ratio of beneﬁts-to-average-wages and deviation of log
output from trend is reproduced here:
U = .19 + 18.3 ∗ (B/W) − 90.0 ∗ (log(Q/Q∗)
(2.64) (4.46) (−8.30)
R2 = .84, ¯ R2 = .82, D-W =2 .18,S E=1 .90.
32across demographic groups. BK documented that the juvenile unemployment rate was much
lower than the adult unemployment rate, which they attribute to much lower juvenile un-
employment beneﬁts. They also documented that unemployment among married women fell
substantially after the October 1931 Anomalies Legislation, which signiﬁcantly raised married
women’s contributory requirements.
The Criticisms of the Unemployment Beneﬁts Explanation
The unemployment beneﬁts explanation has been discounted by interwar British schol-
ars. For example, Eichengreen (1987, p. 182) notes, “Although Keynesians have conceded
that some small portion of interwar unemployment may be explicable on these grounds,
few have sympathy for the notion that the insurance system contributed signiﬁcantly to the
magnitude of the problem.”
T h e r eh a v eb e e nf o u rd i ﬀe r e n tc r i t i c i s m so fB K ’ sa n a l y s i s .O n ei st h a tc r o s s - s e c t i o n a l
data do not support the unemployment beneﬁts explanation (Eichengreen (1987)). Eichen-
green notes that the unemployment beneﬁts explanation predicts that individuals with high
B/W ratios should have had higher rates of unemployment. He evaluates this hypothesis by
estimating a cross-sectional probit model of individual employment status on a constructed
B/W ratio for the individual and other variables and ﬁnds only a small, statistically insignif-
icant relationship between unemployment and his estimate of the B/W ratio. His test uses
survey data collected in the London area during 1929-31 on age, sex, martial status, home
ownership, employment status, wages and other sources of income, and actual and imputed
unemployment beneﬁts.
While a micro analysis could provide a strong evaluation of the unemployment beneﬁts
33explanation, there are data problems with Eichengreen’s constructed B/W r a t i ot h a td on o t
permit such a strong test. One drawback is the measure of the market wage for unemployed
individuals, which Eichengreen estimates as unemployed individuals’ own estimates of their
normal market wage.18 This estimate will likely overstate the actual market wage because
individuals who self-select to search tend to have a higher assessment of their market wage
than individuals who are employed. This suggests that the estimated market wage for the
unemployed is biased upwards. This bias would be expected to be particularly large for long-
term searchers. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the original Beveridge (1945)
report shows that the fraction of unemployed who had been unemployed for more than a year
rose from 4.7% of the total in September of 1929 to 16.4% of the total by August of 1932.
This roughly corresponds to the period in which the data used by Eichengreen were collected.
A second drawback is the lack of explanatory power in a ﬁrst-stage wage prediction
regression for both the employed and the unemployed. To correct for selectivity bias in the
probit regression, Eichengreen uses a predicted wage to construct the B/W ratio, rather than
his wage measures for the employed and unemployed. The problem here is that the predicted
wage equation suﬀers from omitted variable bias and low explanatory power. As Eichengreen
notes, the survey data do not include many of the standard wage equation variables, such
as measures of human capital, years of experience, or the industry in which the individual
works. Consequently, the R2 from the wage regression is only 0.18. Moreover, most of this
explanatory power seems to be coming from relatively young workers: the R2 for heads-of-
household is only 0.08 while that for nonheads-of-household is 0.20. Since the policy provided
very low beneﬁts to young workers, the nonheads-of-household observations may not provide
18For employed individuals, Eichengreen uses their current reported earnings.
34much information about the incentive eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts. This poor ﬁti nt h e
ﬁrst stage wage regression for household heads suggests another possible source of bias in the
coeﬃcient estimates and may also lead to a large standard error on the B/W coeﬃcient in
the probit regression.
The upward bias in the measured wage, along with the relatively poor ﬁti nt h eﬁrst
stage wage regression, may explain why Eichengreen found only a small and statistically in-
signiﬁcant relationship between unemployment and beneﬁts. This suggests that Eichengreen’s
analysis does not provide convincing evidence against the unemployment beneﬁts theory.
Hatton (1994) also argues that cross-sectional data do not support BK’s thesis. He
argues that B/W ratios in cross-sectional data are too small to have raised unemployment.
Hatton’s analysis is based on survey data conducted by the Ministry of Labor in the late
1930s. The government was worried that unemployment beneﬁts were too generous and
asked unemployed individuals to compare their beneﬁts to their previous wage. Table 11
summarizes these data.
The data show that a very small fraction of individuals received beneﬁts that exceeded
their previous wage and that a greater fraction of individuals were receiving beneﬁts between
60 percent and 80 percent of their previous wage. Hatton’s main point is that the fraction of
workers with beneﬁts close to or exceeding their previous wage was too small to support the
unemployment beneﬁts explanation.
The fact that few individuals had complete unemployment insurance replacement rel-
ative to their previous wage sheds no light on the unemployment beneﬁts thesis. This is
because these data miss the two key factors aﬀecting the decisions of unemployed workers:
the opportunity cost of working and the individual’s current market wage - not the individ-
35ual’s previous market wage - relative to the beneﬁt. The higher the opportunity cost and the
lower the current market wage, the more attractive is the unemployment beneﬁt, irrespective
of the individual’s previous wage.
Table 11: Beneﬁt-to-Wage Ratios for
Claimants to Insurance Beneﬁts, 1937
B/W ratio Men Men Women Women
Greater than 18-20 21-64 18-20 21-46
1.0 2.6 0.5 3.4 0.9
0.8 6.5 2.0 8.2 4.4
0.6 17.1 11.7 23.1 17.5
There are good reasons to believe that the opportunity cost of working was high. Many
of the individuals covered under the insurance program were manual laborers, which suggests
that the disutility of working (e.g., coal mining) was high. This tends to reduce the level of
the unemployment beneﬁt necessary to keep individuals in non-market activity. There are
also good reasons to believe that the current wage for many of these individuals may have
been signiﬁcantly lower that their past wage. Recent studies show that individuals who lose
jobs during periods of large layoﬀsr e c e i v es i g n i ﬁcantly lower wages for a number of years
after the initial job loss. For example, Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) report that
high tenure workers earn wages that are about 25 percent lower than their previous wage ﬁve
years after the loss of their previous employment. If this proﬁle also characterized wages in
the UK during the interwar period, then the replacement rate relative to individuals’ current
36market wages would be considerably higher than those presented in Table 11. We conclude
that these data do not reject the unemployment beneﬁts explanation.
The second criticism of BK is their interpretation of the change in unemployment
among married women after their contributory requirements rose. Collins (1982) argues that
the higher contributory requirement may have led married women to leave the unemployment
roles by dropping out of the labor force, rather than becoming employed. In the absence of
individual data about the labor force status of married women, Collins’ argument suggests
that there is an alternative interpretation of the fact that unemployment among married
women dropped relative to single women and males. This is not evidence against BK’s
unemployment beneﬁts explanation, but this alternative interpretation does weaken BK’s
empirical argument about unemployment among married women.
The third criticism is the robustness of their regression results. Ormerod and Worswick
(1982) document that the coeﬃcient on the B/W variable in BK’s regression equation is
sensitive to changes in the sample period, and they argue that this sensitivity raises questions
about BK’s conclusions. Other studies ﬁnd that the value of the B/W coeﬃcient in BK’s
regression is similar to the value found in studies for the post-WWII period. In our view
the Ormerod-Worswick criticism - and more generally the issue of parameter instability -
is uninformative since the regression coeﬃcients would indeed be expected to change with
changes in the sample period. This is because the BK regression was not derived explicitly
from economic theory and thus is probably best viewed as a reduced form relationship rather
than an explicit structural relationship. In particular, an equation for the unemployment rate
that was derived from dynamic theory would not involve just a static relationship between
the aggregate unemployment rate and the current unemployment beneﬁt, but would also
37involve dynamic eﬀects.19 While we don’t ﬁnd parameter instability a convincing rejection
of BK’s conclusions, it does highlight the importance of assessing the impact of these high
unemployment beneﬁts using a formal economic model.
The fourth and most important criticism of BK has been made by Metcalf, Nickell
and Floros (1982). They argue that unemployment beneﬁts are not the key to the interwar
British depression because the unemployment rate in the 1950s was much lower than in the
1930s, even though beneﬁt levels during these periods were about the same. Table 9 shows
the replacement rate, two measures of the unemployment rate, and employment per adult
during the interwar period and during the 1950s. The data for the 1950s replacement rate
are from Maki and Spindler (1975).20 The replacement rate falls from about 0.56 in the 1930s
to 0.38 in the 1950s. This suggests that beneﬁts in the 1950s were lower than those in the
1930s, but about the same as those in the 1920s.
Benjamin and Kochin (1982) responded to this criticism by arguing that changes in
the composition of insured individuals and changes in the reporting of short-term unemploy-
ment spells after World War II can explain the apparent drop in postwar unemployment. In
particular, BK argue that the pool of workers who were insured after WWII had expanded
19For example, in a dynamic model of unemployment, such as Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the surplus
to be split between a worker and an employer from a job is stochastic. Hence, if the welfare level of the
unemployed was suddenly increased due to an increase in the unemployment insurance beneﬁt, then those
workers in jobs with marginal levels of surplus would be induced to immediately quit their jobs. This would
not be the only eﬀect since the unemployment rate could continue to rise as workers initially in jobs with a
suﬃciently high level of surplus experienced negative shocks to the surplus value of their jobs. This dynamic
response is not captured by BK’s static regression, nor can this eﬀect be captured by simply adding some
lagged values of the beneﬁt level to the equation. It is not at all surprising that a misspeciﬁied regression
using a short sample is sensitive to adding or dropping observations.
20There seems to be a surprising degree of lack of consensus as to the level of the beneﬁt-to-wage ratio in
the postwar period. Metcalf, Nickell, and Floros (1982) report numbers that are much closer to the interwar
level (.43 for 1951-57 and .54 for 1958-65). We have gone with Maki and Spindler’s (1975) numbers, which
they cite as coming from the Department of Health and Social Security. Obviously, using Metcalf, Nickell,
and Floros’ (1982) numbers would only sharpen the criticism.
38considerably to include many nonmanual workers who do not experience the same unemploy-
ment risks. They also note that post-World War II unemployment statistics do not count
workers experiencing very short-run spells. These two points raise questions about comparing
unemployment rates before and after World War II, but they do not address the implications
of the relative constancy of the replacement rate for employment: the employment rate re-
turned to its pre-World War I level of 0.68 by the 1950s.
Overall, our assessment is that the empirical focus of the debate makes it hard to
draw conclusions about the eﬀects of unemployment beneﬁts. This is particularly noteworthy
regarding the static relationship assumed between beneﬁts and unemployment, when standard
theory predicts a dynamic relationship between these variables. For example, in a dynamic
model of unemployment, such as Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the surplus to be split
between a worker and an employer from a job is stochastic. Hence, if the welfare level of
the unemployed was suddenly increased due to an increase in the unemployment insurance
beneﬁt, then those workers in jobs with marginal levels of surplus would be induced to
immediately quit their jobs. This would not be the only eﬀect since the unemployment rate
could continue to rise as workers initially in jobs with a suﬃciently high level of surplus
experience negative shocks to the surplus value of the individual’s job. There are additional
dynamic eﬀects coming through search. In particular, an individual’s reservation wage and
search intensity depends on their level of assets, which implies that the beneﬁt/wage ratio
is not a suﬃcient statistic for determining employment status (see Gomes, Greenwood, and
Rebelo, 2001). These dynamic responses are not captured either by BK’s static regression or
by the static regressions run by BK’s critics.
In summary, the lack of an appropriate theoretical foundation undercuts the force of
39the arguments on both sides of this debate and leads us to use a general equilibrium model
that highlights the incentive eﬀects of beneﬁts and the dynamic equilibrium relationship
between beneﬁt changes and employment.
B. Notes on the Data Presentation
1. Unless otherwise speciﬁed the data are from Feinstein (1972): National Income,
Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965.
2. Data on the U.S/U.K. nominal exchange rate, the U.K. money stock, and the U.S.
GNP deﬂator are from Friedman and Schwartz (1982): Monetary Trends in the United States
and the United Kingdom.
3. Data on labor union membership, number of days lost through disputes, and average
hours worked are from Mitchell and Deane (1962): British Historical Statistics.
4. Data on nominal hourly wages by employment category are from British Labor
Statistics: Historical Abstract 1886-1968.
5. The data on French interwar output are from Mitchell and Deane (1962).
6. Data on unemployment beneﬁts come from Maki and Spindler (1975). The Eﬀect
of Unemployment Compensation on the Rate of Unemployment in Great Britain, Oxford
Economic Papers.
7. Data on the monthly retail price index, the wage index, the percentage of insured
workers employed and unemployed, and the industrial production index are from Capie and
Collins (1983).
408. World GDP and population data are from Maddison (1995): Monitoring the World
Economy. The countries in our measure of world output are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
w a y ,S w e d e n ,S w i t z e r l a n d ,U S A ,S p a i n ,A r g e n t i n a ,B r a z i l ,C h i l e ,I n d i a .
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